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Chapter 2  
The mass media, democracy and the public sphere  
INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter we explore the role played by the mass media in political participation, in 
particular in the relationship between the laity and established power. There is a long-running 
debate in media theory over the ways in which the media not only disseminate elite, critical 
opinion but also influence the formation, expression and consumption of public opinion 
(Halloran, 1970; Lang and Lang, 1968). How far do the mass media provide a public sphere in 
which citizens may debate issues in a democratic forum and in which those in power may be 
held accountable to the public? In this chapter we examine the way television is responding to 
economic and regulatory pressures to move from a public service model towards a market model 
(Blumler, 1992; Collins et al. 1986; Garnham, 1990; Qualter, 1991); the media are changing their 
relation to political processes.  
 
These changes affect the relationship between ordinary people and elite representatives of 
established power. There is a concern in liberal democracies about having an involved public. 
Here we are interested not so much in the degree of involvement but in different types of 
involvement. There is a difference between an elite democracy where communication between 
established power and the laity takes the form of dissemination from the powerful and the 
representation of ordinary beliefs as mass opinion, and a participatory democracy where 
established power is engaged in some kind of dialogue with the public. Recently this debate has 
centred on how to conceive of the role of the citizen in modern western democracies.  
 
Both the left and right of the political spectrum are concerned with the individual as citizen, and 
with undermining the authority of the expert or elite (Andrews, 1991; Barbalet, 1988). The right 
attacks experts for their abstract, biased or ungrounded authority over the laity. They argue for 
reductions in restrictions on broadcasting to encourage competition according to market forces 
and audience demand, thereby putting pressure on the existing broadcast channels to become 
more accessible and populist. The left has also been concerned with the rights of individuals and 
the validity of everyday experience. While for the political right, citizenship signifies 
community, self- help and ‘Victorian’ morality, for the left, citizenship emphasizes human rights 
and civil liberties: ‘citizenship, therefore, combines in rather unusual ways the public and social 
with the individual aspects of political life’ (Held, 1991:21).  
 
Access programmes, talk shows and audience discussion programmes all capture elements of 
these concerns, providing a diverse appeal for both the audience and the experts, who, whether 
on the left or the right, have reasons and justifications for participating. It may be reason enough 
that the media are a powerful force in contemporary society, being increasingly implicated in the 
construction of political events and the management of political decisions (see, for example, 
Garton et al. 1991; Keane, 1991; Raboy and Dagenais, 1992).  
 
Thus the debate over political involvement and communication has recently focused on the 
notion of ‘citizenship’, and one aspect of this concern is with the notion of the ‘public sphere’. If 
the citizenry is to play a role in a democracy then it needs access to an institutionally guaranteed 
forum in which to express their opinions and to question established power. We will argue that 
the media now constitute the major forum for political communication. Thus the debate about 
public involvement of citizens in political communication leads to questions about the media as a 
public sphere where the relations between established power and the citizenry take place.  
 
The starting point we have chosen for our discussion of the media as a public sphere of political 
communication is the work of Habermas (1984; 1989) on the bourgeois public sphere. 
Influenced by critical theory, Habermas sees the media as creating a society of private and 
fragmented individuals for whom it is difficult to form the public rational-critical opinion which 
could oppose established power. He attacks the media for providing a pseudo-public sphere 
which distracts the laity from political action, being a sphere of public relations and passive 
spectatorship rather than genuine public debate. However, Habermas’s position (1987b) contains 
within it an ideal of public communication: if unfettered by institutional control, this ideal public 
communication might generate the critical consensus which he considers necessary for public 
participation in democratic political processes. Can the media potentially provide sites for public 
participation, expert accountability, integration of expert and lay knowledge and the provision of 
ideal communicative situations?  
 
Habermas’s position reflects the ambivalence felt by many towards the mass media–that here is a 
great power, but can it be harnessed for the public good? We suggest that pessimistic answers 
tend to underestimate the complex and contradictory or fragmented nature of the contemporary 
mass media which opens the way for some escape from institutional control, while more 
optimistic positions often set too high ideals for the public sphere. Those alternative formulations 
of the public sphere which recognise and build on the complex and fragmentary nature of the 
media suggest more positively that the media could facilitate and legitimize the public 
negotiation–through compromise rather than consensus–of meanings among oppositional and 
marginalized groups.  
 
ELITE AND PARTICIPATORY CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY  
‘Democracy’ is generally used to refer to the rights and responsibilities of citizens in capitalist 
economies. The will of the people, as expressed through representation, consent and 
participation, plays a central role in legitimating a democracy:  
Any claim that a certain state or government, regime or society is ‘really’ or ‘in the last 
analysis’ democratic, however implausible it may seem, must involve the implication that in 
some way or other the government, regime or state in question serves or represents the people.  
(Arblaster, 1987:8–9) 
  
The starting point for modern theories of democracy is consent, for it is the idea that 
government is an artifice, legitimated only by the agreement of subjects who are ‘naturally’ 
free, that revived the democratic tradition.  
(Phillips, 1991:23)  
The mass media play a crucial role in the modern political process, for even in elite forms of 
democracy, the polity requires some mediated communication with the populace to gain consent. 
Freedom of expression has long been seen as essential to protecting the rights of the individual 
from political tyranny: a government legitimated through consent depends on a free press 
(Keane, 1991; Koss, 1984). However, this mediation is not neutral but affects how political 
processes are communicated. Talking of general elections, it is clear that ‘talk is endlessly 
circulated around all these sites [media, politics, public relations, press conferences] in practices 
of commentary, quotation and polemical reformulation. Statements are thus re-presented in 
different discursive domains, and in this re-presentation they are transformed’ (Garton et al. 
1991:100).  
 
As the implied audience for the liberal press was the bourgeois individual, the individual was 
affirmed as the basic social, moral and political unit. Within the democratic tradition one can 
envisage a dimension of public involvement in political processes. At one end the populace has 
little direct role in politics but policies should be enacted in the public interest with the consent 
of the people. At the other extreme, ordinary people participate in the political process through 
voting, lobbying, inquiry, membership of political parties and trade unions, and so forth. The 
poles of this opposition can be used to understand a transformation from an elite to a 
participatory democracy. One can account for recent changes in contemporary democracies in 
terms of this transition.  
 
Two problems beset this progressive conception of democracy; one is bureaucratization and the 
other is inequalities in political influence. The mass media contribute to both these problems, for 
they are social organizations which institutionalize particular forms and rights of access, modes 
of participation and types of influence. The political role of the media is not, therefore, simply 
dependent on the nature of the political process; because it mediates political communications, 
the workings of the mass media are also constitutive of that process. Mediated political control of 
the masses is easier in an elite democracy, where the media are under pressure to propound 
critically the ideas of the political elite to the populace. Under a more participatory democracy, 
control over and access to media production processes by the public becomes a vital dimension 
of political participation.  
 
However, there is no necessary connection between the development of mediated systems of 
communication and the development of participatory democracy. For example, while there is a 
vast difference between the practice of democratic government in ancient Greece and the modern 
democratic tradition, significant features of participatory democracy also existed in those earlier 
times (Held, 1987). Although some were excluded from the status of citizen, the argument for 
individual rights has gradually led to their inclusion (see, for example, the extension of the 
franchise to women; Phillips, 1991). The idea of citizens’ political participation suggests a 
democracy where individuals have a responsibility to act in the political process beyond their 
personal interest. This contrasts with a democracy whose concern is the provision of protective 
environments within which individuals can conduct their own business. For Locke, this latter 
was to be achieved by restricting the rights of rulers and the legitimate sphere of political 
decision making, resulting in a political culture based on respect for leaders and on very limited 
involvement in the political process for the ruled. As one of our respondents commented: 
That is certainly one of my worries, that people don’t think about what is happening, and it’s 
not really their fault, it’s just the way society is going now. You work, you get a pay cheque, 
and you want to spend the rest of the time having fun and you don’t want to think about that 
sort of thing [i.e. politics]. (P2.157)  
While one might have expected that the gradual move towards participatory democracy would 
have produced a greater sense of public involvement in politics, there is some evidence of 
growing public apathy and a less stable electoral profile, with swings and unpredictable election 
results resulting from more uncommitted voters (Heath and Topf, 1987; Parry et al. 1992). There 
are two arguments to be made here. Firstly, the shift to participatory democracy coincides with 
the expansion of the mass media, and many, including Habermas (see below) attribute public 
apathy to the effects of the media in undermining traditional class affiliations and transforming 
political debate into a managed show. Secondly, Heath and Topf (1987) suggest that we are 
seeing a change in modes of participation as social changes since the war have produced a 
greater section of the population who are politically confident and competent. Ideally, they 
suggest a widening of the definition of civic culture beyond that of deference and involvement to 
include attitudes to the economic and social order: economic equity, civil liberty, and law and 
order are all issues which constitute the political consciousness of the modern electorate:  
What we have found, then, is evidence of widespread but long-standing distrust of politicians, 
coupled with a widespread and growing self-confidence on the part of the electorate to try to 
bring influence to bear on parliament. There is no evidence, however, that either phenomenon 
implies any loss of respect for democratic procedures.  
(Heath and Topf, 1987:58)  
Let us not take too simplistic a view of political involvement and power. If we conceptualize the 
political subject only as a voter then the intersection between political and social life is restricted 
to struggles over the franchise. However, as forms of political involvement diversify to include 
broader aspects of social relations, then the political subject incorporates the multiple subject 
positions that characterize these social relations. If the person becomes political then what 
constitutes a political person becomes more complicated:  
I affirm…the existence in each individual of multiple subject positions corresponding both to 
the different social relations in which the individual is inserted and to the discourses which 
constitute these relations.  
(Mouffe, 1988:90)  
However, Mouffe (1988) argues that the politicizing of social relations is a function of the post-
war expansion of market capitalism and need not imply greater political power for those 
involved. Indeed, the contrary may be true, and she points to ‘new social movements’ such as 
feminism which offer resistances to new types of oppression which are emerging in advanced 
capitalist societies. The questions which she asks of these social movements might also be asked 
of other parties drawn into this wider conception of political participation, including the mass 
media:  
(1) What kind of antagonism do the new social movements express? (2) What is their link 
with the development of capitalism? (3) How should they be positioned in a socialist strategy? 
(4) What are the implications of these struggles for our conception of democracy?  
(Mouffe, 1988:89) 
  
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATORY MASS MEDIA  
Carpignano et al. (1990) argue that in audience discussion programmes:  
The crisis of the bourgeois public sphere is fully visible and displayed in front of our eyes. 
The crisis of representational democracy is the crisis of the traditional institutions of the 
public sphere, the party, the union etc., and most importantly, the present mass refusal of 
politics. If we think about the reconstitution of a public sphere in terms of the revitalization of 
old political organizations…then the embryonic discursive practices of a talk show might 
appear interesting, but ultimately insignificant…but if we conceive of politics today 
as…consolidated in the circulation of discursive practices rather than formal organizations, 
then a common place that formulates and propagates common senses and metaphors that 
govern our lives might be at the crossroad of a reconceptualization of collective practices.  
(Carpignano et al. 1990:54)  
This view captures the ambivalence of many towards the potential of the mass media. Optimists 
and pessimists base their cases on different and opposed constructions of modernity (Seidman, 
1990): one can analyse the media as part of the secular, millennial myth of progress or as part of 
the apocalyptic myth of darkness and decline. For the pessimistic approach of the critical 
theorists of the Frankfurt School, rationality is lost as mass culture increasingly dominates 
popular consciousness, offering only a consumerist culture to satisfy false, commodified desires. 
Some would argue that a culture of critical discourse still exists, both in academia and also as a 
strand surviving in public organizations and the mass media (Gouldner, 1976).  
 
The position of the Frankfurt School has been attacked most recently by postmodern theorists for 
whom society is too fragmented and heterogeneous for any unitary description. Instead they 
advocate ‘an ideal of a more open, decentralised society that values differences and permits 
fluidity in desires, identity, and institutional order’ (Seidman, 1990:234). Either position suggests 
a potentially radical role for the media through, for example, the audience discussion 
programmes. The programmes may offer either a forum for the critical discussion of 
contemporary political and social issues or alternatively they may provide opportunities for the 
expression of diverse social identities.  
 
The move from elite to participatory social and political arrangements is resulting in changes 
within the mass media from the paternalistic ‘auntie’ of elite programming to a potentially more 
responsive and open medium. Our focus is on the growth of broadcast genres involving open 
access or audience participation. These can be seen to challenge traditional oppositions between 
producer and audience, text and reader, expert and laity, and the response of the audience has 
been shown by recent media research on the active, interpretive, sometimes resistant, and even 
subversive audience of popular culture (Curran, 1991; Livingstone, 1990; Morley, 1980). 
Consequently, some are enthusiastic about such forms of programming (Scannell, 1990), 
anticipating greater participation and involvement for the viewers, a transfer of power from a 
paternalistic media to an ‘active viewer’ (Livingstone, 1990) or ‘citizen viewer’ (Corner, 1991).  
 
Nonetheless, a critical perspective on the mass media in general and on audience access and 
participation programmes in particular has long existed, suggesting that such programmes are a 
trick to capture a passive, mass audience through the illusion of influence and involvement. 
Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948) argued that the media have a narcotizing function on their 
audience, undermining the practice of democracy: ‘modern media may encourage citizens to 
know more, even to be more opinionated, but to do less about public affairs’ (Tuchman, 
1988:604). Similarly, commenting on media debates, Habermas claims that ‘critical debate 
arranged in this manner certainly fulfils important social-psychological functions, especially that 
of a tranquillizing substitute for action’ (Habermas, 1989:164). Lang and Lang (1983:21) claim 
that ‘the mass public is still condemned to a bystander role…privy to, but not part of, the give-
and-take through which parties with conflicting interests hammer out an acceptable policy’. The 
ever-increasing importance of opinion polls in elections suggests to some one way in which ‘the 
media discourage political participation and meaningful social change’ (Tuchman, 1988:604), 
providing a ‘managed show’ (Thompson, 1990) of public participation without any 
accompanying influence, role or power. Elliot (1986) argues that we face ‘a continuation of the 
shift away from involving people in society as political citizens of nation states towards 
involving them as consumption units in a corporate world’ (Elliot, 1986:106).  
 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE  
By ‘the public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something 
approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of 
the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals 
assemble to form a public body.  
(Habermas, 1984:49)  
 
Habermas (1987a, 1987b; see also Fraser, 1989) argues for four domains of modern social life, 
divided according to two dimensions: public versus private and system-integrated (roughly, 
based on strategic calculations and mechanistic functions concerned with money and power) 
versus socially-integrated (roughly, based on consensual references to moral norms and values). 
Material reproduction is the function of the official capitalist economy and the modern 
administrative state; both of these are system-integrated, but the economy is part of the private 
domain while the state is public. Symbolic reproduction (involving socialization, solidarity 
formation and cultural transmission) is the function of the two socially-integrated institutions of 
the modern ‘life-world’–the private family and the public sphere.  
 
The two private domains have historically been linked by the roles of worker and consumer, 
while the public domains have been linked by the roles of citizen and client. Habermas makes 
the further, historical argument that influence, having once flowed from socially-integrated to 
system-integrated domains, is now flowing the other way around, colonizing the life-world and 
undermining the public sphere. Fraser (1989) notes that these roles are gendered (consumer and 
client are feminine, worker and citizen are masculine) and adds in a fifth role, that of childrearer. 
She argues that influence also flows from the family to the economy and the state. However, she 
would agree with Habermas that the relations between system and life-world and the ‘health’ of 
the contemporary life-world are major concerns.  
 
The mass media, primarily concerned with symbolic reproduction, address both family and 
public sphere and have complex relations with both economy and state. Does the impact of the 
media inevitably result in the fragmentation of public opinion or can a more positive role for the 
media in the formation of a discursive public sphere be worked out? For Habermas (1989), the 
public sphere (Öffentlichkeit) is a space where private individuals discuss public matters, a space 
which mediates between society and the state. The public sphere has a potential influence over 
power by forming a critical consensus which produces a coherent public opinion and by making 
the state accountable to its citizens: ‘the public sphere is…what one might call the factory of 
politics–its site of production…the space in which politics is first made possible at all and 
communicable’ (Kluge, 1981–2:213). Central to the public sphere is ‘the necessity of discursive 
justification of democratic politics’ (Benhabib, 1992:119).  
 
As widespread concern grows over the way in which the public service ethos is being destroyed 
and replaced by a market model (Qualter, 1991) while communication and information 
technologies expand and diversify, Habermas’s discussion of the public sphere offers much to a 
critical analysis of the relationship between media, power and the public. The argument is a 
historical one: Habermas argues that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there 
emerged a ‘bourgeois public sphere [which] created a forum in which the authority of the state 
could be criticized and called upon to justify itself before an informed and reasoning public’ 
(Thompson, 1990:109). This forum was founded on the principle of ‘publicness’, ‘that the 
personal opinions of private individuals could evolve into a public opinion through the rational-
critical debate of a public of citizens which was open to all and free from domination’ 
(Thompson, 1990:112).  
 
Habermas’s account has attracted criticism as a historical account of the rise and fall of the 
public sphere, for the scrutiny of revisionist historiography suggests it to be more of an 
idealization than a historical reality (Curran, 1991; Eley, 1992). However, it may and does still 
serve as ‘a usefully mobilising fiction’ (Robbins, 1990a: 3), particularly in amending the failure 
of Marxist critical social theory to distinguish sufficiently between the state and societal forums 
for public discussion (Fraser, 1990). This has led to an emphasis on the coercive, hegemonic role 
of the state in regulating broadcasting and on the cynical aims of the commercial broadcasting 
model:  
Mass culture has earned its rather dubious name precisely by achieving increased sales by 
adapting to the need for relaxation and entertainment on the part of consumer strata with 
relatively little education, rather than through the guidance of an enlarged public toward the 
appreciation of a culture undamaged in its substance.  
(Habermas, 1989:165)  
Television viewers might agree here:  
 
People are generally having less and less time to take anything seriously, and I feel that 
commercial pressures will feed into that because they are totally dependent on the sponsors, 
so you don’t want all this heavy stuff, you just want a bit of light stuff, trivialization like the 
Sun newspaper. (D3.151)  
 
The BBC seem to be saying that they have a free voice, and yet they have always been 
terribly establishment, haven’t they? Are they changing? (D4.184)  
The market may be transforming the media into an unrepresentative, nonparticipatory system, a 
system made up of major, centralized monopolies, which together offer a narrower and more 
uniform ideological and cultural range of meanings (Curran, 1991). However, there has been 
insufficient theorizing of any positive vision of a public service ethic–of how broadcasting 
‘should’ be (although see Blumler, 1992). As market models of broadcasting are partly 
legitimated through a critique of the elitist and patronizing aspects of the public service ethic, an 
emancipatory rather than an oppressive conception of the public service ethic is needed to 
counter the arguments for a market-led broadcasting system (Garnham, 1990; Keane, 1991; 
Tebbutt, 1989). After all, ‘the television network, airways, belong to all of us’ (P4.150) and we 
all know that:  
There are countries surely where they’re not allowed to talk like we are, wasn’t it Russia or 
was it in Germany, something like this? I mean, we can raise our opinions and we can discuss. 
(SC.320)  
Arguing more positively now, Habermas claims that:  
The bourgeois public sphere could be understood as the sphere of private individuals 
assembled into a public body, which almost immediately laid claim to the officially regulated 
‘intellectual newspapers’ for use against the public authority itself…To the principle of the 
existing power, the bourgeois public opposed the principle of supervision–that very principle 
which demands that proceedings be made public.  
(Habermas, 1984:52)  
THE MASS, THE PUBLIC, THE AUDIENCE  
The concept of ‘the public’ has become caught up in debates over the mass media, mass 
consumption, feminism and democracy (Fraser, 1989). People have become suspicious of those 
who speak in the name, or interest, of the public (Robbins, 1990a)–as indeed, they may have of 
all metanarratives (Lyotard, 1984). Robbins (1990b) analyses the various rhetorical and 
justificatory appeals made through the use of the term ‘public’, where sometimes public is 
opposed to the market and aligned with the intellectuals, and sometimes it is opposed to the elite 
and aligned with consumerism:  
The current crisis of representation that subjects all ‘representatives’ as such to the immediate 
charge of abusing/inventing the ‘public’ from which they claim to derive legitimacy might be 
seen as a phenomenon produced by the market, and as serving the capitalist status quo rather 
better than it serves the public interest.  
(Robbins, 1990b: 105)  
Traditionally, social theory distinguishes between the public and the mass (Robbins, 1990b). In 
contrast with the mass, Mills (1959) characterized the public as egalitarian, for as many people 
express opinions as receive them, as operating a form of communication which permits 
immediate and effective feedback, as affording the translation of public opinion into effective 
action even against the status quo or authority; and as constructing an autonomous public 
opinion. Institutional control over mass communication means that fewer express than receive 
opinions, and feedback is made near impossible for an individual. Moreover, the authorities 
control whether or not the outcome of expressed opinion leads to action.  
 
In some ways, the public versus mass debate parallels that over the active versus passive 
audience which has recently occupied media theory (see Chapter 4). The concept of the active 
viewer counters images of the viewer as duped, mindless, brainwashed or manipulated. It has 
been supported by both the failures of effects research (Roberts and Bachen, 1981) and the 
successes of audience comprehension and reception research (Ang, 1985; Corner, 1991; Liebes 
and Katz, 1990; Livingstone, 1991) which demonstrate that viewers play an active role in the 
construction of programme meanings, as influenced by the viewer’s sociocultural and family 
context (Liebes and Katz, 1990; Morley, 1986), their uses and gratifications in viewing (Blumler, 
Gurevitch and Katz, 1985) and their sociocognitive processes of reception and interpretation 
(Livingstone, 1990).  
 
How we think about the active or passive viewer depends on our theoretical framework. The 
economic and production framework of early media research led to a concern with the viewer as 
alienated worker (seen as passive, male, a viewer of news and action-adventure)–a problem for 
the private domain (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1977; Halloran, 1970). The viewer as conceived by 
British Cultural Studies is the consumer-viewer, seen as resistant, subversive, female–a 
consumer of soap opera, magazines and romances, again understood as being within the private 
domain (Curti, 1988; Hall, 1980; Hobson, 1982). Now we have the citizen-viewer, seen as 
participating, potentially at least, in democratic processes of the public sphere (Corner, 1991; 
Curran, 1991), processes which may be more accessible to many women than the public sphere 
has been hitherto, being also part of domestic, daytime television. As more ordinary people 
participate in making television programmes as well as receiving them, this gives new force to 
the concept of the active viewer. In this chapter we examine the argument that participation in 
the mass media, as audience or as programme contributor, may count as acting as a public rather 
than as a mass and hence as political participation.  
 
THE REFEUDALIZATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE  
Habermas (1989) argues that the public sphere exists now only as a promise. Party politics and 
the manipulation of the mass media have resulted in ‘a “refeudalization” of the public sphere, 
where representation and appearances outweigh rational debate’ (Holub, 1991:6) and where the 
rational–critical public is transformed into a mass, manipulated by persuasive authority. The 
public sphere has been undermined by, among other factors, class biases in criteria of admission, 
the expansion of an interventionist state, new techniques of opinion management and a loss of 
institutional meeting places. ‘This refeudalization of the public sphere turns the latter into a 
theatre and turns politics into a managed show in which leaders and parties routinely seek the 
acclamatory assent of a depoliticized population’ (Thompson, 1990:113). Thus:  
Large organizations strive for political compromises with the state and with each other, 
excluding the public sphere whenever possible. But at the same time the large organizations 
must assure themselves of at least plebiscitary support from the mass of the population 
through an apparent display of openness.  
(Habermas, 1984:54)  
The mass media are a medium of talk, of communicative action, of potential consensus: ‘today 
newspapers and magazines, radio and television are the media of the public sphere’ (Habermas, 
1984:49). To the extent that refeudalization has occurred, Habermas is highly critical of the role 
of the media in the public–or pseudo-public–sphere. He argues that we have moved from a 
culture-debating to a culture-consuming public:  
The deprivatized province of interiority was hollowed out by the mass media; a pseudo-public 
sphere of a no longer literary public was patched together to create a sort of superfamilial 
zone of familiarity.  
(Habermas, 1989:162)  
Marx ‘denounced public opinion as false consciousness: it hid before itself its own true character 
as a mask of bourgeois class interests’ (Habermas, 1989:124). Following Marx, it has been 
argued that, as the public is divided against itself into property owners and the workers, there can 
be no unified public voice (or ‘general public’), no-one can abstract from their particular class 
position to speak for everyone, and ‘citizens’ now expect services to be provided for them 
without having to participate politically. Political communication, particularly during election 
campaigns, may be seen to be managed or ‘designed’ increasingly by the mass media (Lang and 
Lang, 1983; Negrine, 1989; Nimmo and Combs, 1990). Private voting patterns do not add up to 
Habermas’s conception of public opinion: they are not formed rationally, nor in discussion with 
others, and so do not constitute critical, rational participation. Parliament can be seen as evolving 
away from a debating body, so that the real decisions are made more through political lobbying, 
committees and prearranged deals (Grant, 1989), and the debating chamber becomes a display of 
party unity rather than of genuine debate (Thompson, 1990). The televising of parliament made 
this change public, and maybe exacerbated it:  
Since we have seen parliament and question time, we’ve all changed our views on parliament. 
In parliament you don’t deviate from your strongly held view, you just get up and contradict. 
(SC.523)  
As traditional social class ties weaken, a political culture of persuasion has grown up, where 
ideas are paraded as goods for the electorate to consume rather than as representing underlying 
class interest or other political ideology. In the mass media also, the elite try to persuade and the 
mass consume according to personal taste. As media effects and attitude persuasion research has 
shown (Bryant and Zillman, 1986; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981), even those who are informed and 
do argue in public spaces often tend only to mutually confirm their previous ideas: ‘most people 
have got a very definite view on politics and they are not going to change their minds’ (F1.149). 
Thus argument does not necessarily result in public opinion change but rather becomes an 
opportunity to express diverse persuasive appeals:  
Publicity loses its critical function in favour of a staged display; even arguments are 
transmuted into symbols to which again one can not respond by arguing but only by 
identifying with them.  
(Habermas, 1989:206)  
 POSSIBILITIES FOR CRITICAL–RATIONAL PUBLIC DEBATE  
Habermas (1987b) later holds open the possibility of rational debate, thus suggesting the 
incompleteness of the process of refeudalisation in the public sphere. Based on a universal 
pragmatics whose principles specify the conditions which make utterances possible, he outlines a 
model of undistorted rational communication which is essential for the potentially emancipatory 
role he assigns to public discourse in a democratic society. So, while the bourgeois public sphere 
failed because it could never satisfy the institutional conditions for open dialogue, the possibility 
remains that language itself may escape institutional control. That the refeudalisation of the 
public sphere is as yet incomplete is supported by the active audience debate. Because of the 
complexities and technological developments of modern media:  
The individuals who receive mediated messages have acquired new forms of power and a new 
awareness of rights…it has also given [political] leaders a new visibility and vulnerability 
before audiences which are more extensive and endowed with more information and more 
power…than ever before.  
(Thompson, 1990:115)  
Thus the individual may not simply be the passive consumer which the media–and critics of the 
culture industry–often assume. One may argue that in contemporary society it is not possible for 
the media to fashion the world so completely and consistently, that no attempt to influence can 
be so successful, so lacking in interstices, so without contradictions. Thus it remains possible that 
public interests can be served by mass communication. For Habermas, the laity can only retain 
influence over established power through the development of ‘self-organised public spheres’. 
The inherent problem with any attempt to organize and galvanize public opinion in the mass 
media age is that ‘autonomous public spheres can draw their strength only from the resources of 
largely rationalized life-worlds’ (Habermas, 1987a: 361), thereby risking social control at the 
moment when the formation and the expression of public opinion takes place.  
 
Consequently, public opinion may function as a critical influence in democratic debate and 
decisions, or as an object to be moulded, the result of public communication or opinion 
management. The process of making opinion public may correspondingly be understood as 
critical or manipulative but however it is understood, the mass media play a central role. In 
contrast to Habermas’s conception of the mass media as fully institutionalized and all-powerful, 
there have been some recent attempts to theorize the media as being one of many sources of 
influence on public opinion. Garnham (1990) attempts to revalue the public service ethic, Ang 
(1985) analyses the diverse ways in which the media may be seen as either oppressive or 
emancipatory, and Curran (1991) proposes that the mass media has a radical-democratic 
potential. These arguments suggest that there are a number of contradictions in the contemporary 
political functions of television. The media contains both manipulative and emancipatory 
elements.  
 
Some of the contradictions inherent in the media are illustrated by Scannell’s analysis of how, 
since the 1930s, the British Broadcasting Corporation has aspired to a representative mediatory 
role between government and people. For example, it has attempted to provide the public with  
both an awareness of the consequences of unemployment and a role in terms of individual action 
to mitigate those consequences (Scannell, 1986). On the other hand, direct public access to the 
mass media, which raises problematic issues of political participation, citizenship, public opinion 
and the active viewer, has traditionally been heavily limited, especially compared to the access 
given to representatives of elite groups (Scannell and Cardiff, 1991; Tebbutt, 1989). Audience 
participation has been generally restricted to audience measurement and viewers’ letters. While 
the industry may state that ‘we owe it to our audience as well as to ourselves to establish some 
systematic method of inviting the public to participate in shaping what we do’ (Frank Stanton of 
CBS, 1960, quoted in Bower, 1973), this has probably been valued more by the industry than by 
the audience itself and has certainly been regarded cynically by social commentators.  
 
The attempt to treat public service listeners as citizens rather than consumers and the subsequent 
undermining of this attempt by the market model reflects the fundamental contradiction between 
conceptions of the individual in the political and economic realms (for Habermas, the public and 
the private realms):  
Within the political realm the individual is defined as a citizen exercising public rights of 
debate, voting, etc., within a communally agreed structure of rules and towards communally 
defined ends. The value system is essentially social and the legitimate end of social action is 
the public good. Within the economic realm on the other hand the individual is defined as 
producer and consumer exercising private rights through purchasing power on the market in 
the pursuit of private interests, his or her actions being coordinated by the invisible hand of 
the market.  
(Garnham, 1990:110)  
While the mass media operate across both realms, ‘political communication is forced to channel 
itself via commercial media’ (Garnham, 1990:111), thus prioritizing the individual as private 
consumer over the individual as public citizen. Social commentators, viewers and viewer 
organizations believe in widespread and diverse participation in rational public debate. A 
contemporary problem is that the opposition between public broadcasting and commercial 
broadcasting has been linked to elite and participatory forms of democracy. Thus one line of 
justification for commercial conditions in broadcasting is that public broadcasting is elitist. The 
problem is that commercial interest uses an emancipatory rhetoric offering the illusion of 
involvement relative to public broadcasting. Neither model allows for the emergence of a critical 
public sphere. The elite model reduces public to mass opinion and communication to 
dissemination; the market model uses involvement to position the viewer as consumer rather 
than citizen. Participatory television such as the audience discussion programmes exist in the 
interstices of these two models. Public broadcast opens up to the public, commercial television 
gains a conscience. The move to participation provides the unintended consequences of 
involvement.  
 
SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS AND PUBLICITY  
You need to have responsible people, authoritative people, civil servants, where the particular 
area being discussed is an area where civil servants are involved directly in making decisions. 
You want the decision makers in there, the people who actually have to deal with the 
problem, if it’s the police, you want to have policemen in there, you know. And if it’s the 
army you need to have some soldiers in there, and I’m sure Kilroy wouldn’t hesitate in any of 
those cases to try and get people to express those points of view. I would be disappointed if 
any of the organizations concerned were reluctant to allow representatives to go along and 
express their own personal views.  
(George, viewer)  
 
Political parties, special-interest groups, pressure groups, charities and so forth, which operate 
according to their own internal public spheres, may generate a kind of quasi-public opinion. 
Their representatives then enter the general public sphere to express opinions which, insofar as 
they also represent broader public opinion, may contribute to a rational–critical public debate, 
influence political processes and hold the system accountable. How ‘public’ the opinion 
expressed is depends on how the organization’s membership is constituted and how it relates to 
the state, to other social organizations, and to the mass media.  
 
However, special interest groups arise from the private sphere and, together with political parties 
which arise from the public sphere, they may use the mass media to attempt to squeeze out the 
public, often obtaining their consent through manipulated acquiescence rather than critical 
discussion. Associations become concerned with the representative showing of their members in 
the public sphere–‘the aura of personally represented authority’ (Habermas, 1989:200) as a part 
of public relations and the refeudalized public sphere: ‘the public sphere becomes the court 
before which public prestige can be displayed–rather than in which public critical debate is 
carried on’ (Habermas, 1989:201). If the public sphere is not genuine, accountability cannot be 
authentic, but is rather a matter of public relations.  
 
Nonetheless, public debate among special interest groups may generate contestation and 
negotiation, if not critical discussion, as well as the dissemination of interested views. Further, 
special interest representatives may represent the views of particular, often disempowered 
publics (such as the disabled or the elderly) who are frequently excluded from the general public 
sphere of public meetings, public consultations and media debates. Public debate between special 
interest group representatives thus brings specific or local issues to a wider public and makes 
conflicts visible.  
 
At least these processes bring significant, previously hidden aspects of political processes into 
the public domain. The opportunity of influencing the public is so great that special interest 
groups, established power and members of the public are compelled to run the risk of public 
exposure. In Habermas’s theory, one gets the impression of politics as a complex, emergent 
process where discussions, debates and negotiations take place in private (in families, committee 
rooms and the meetings of special interest groups) only coming to the light of critical exposure 
when they have been formulated clearly and in controlled forms of debate. Participatory 
programming brings public exposure earlier in this process. Ideas and opinions don’t have to be 
‘well formed’ before they can be expressed. Committees don’t have to make hard-and-fast 
decisions to respond on a given issue and special interest groups don’t need to have a worked-out 
position from which to speak. The media thus enter the political process at a more open, less 
formalized stage, when there are not necessarily any clear opinions, policies or positions which 
the media can manipulate and control. The interaction between parties to the discussion is 
discursive rather than a formal exchange of views. Getting involved in discursive exchange 
transforms all parties, which is not true of the dissemination of information. However, whether 
this transformation is one of changing the mode of public relations or whether it changes the 
processes of politics and everyday life is a question which goes beyond the scope of this book.  
THE OPPOSITIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE  
The view that the mediated public sphere is an illusion which masks the hegemonic domination 
of the masses by the bourgeoisie is receiving considerable criticism (Curran, 1991; Garnham, 
1990). Lyotard (1984) claims that power cannot be and is not centralized in any one social 
stratum, but rather that it is dispersed across diverse institutions and discourses, including the 
mass media. The very idea of ‘the public’, as unitary, homogenous and able to speak 
disinterestedly, must be problematized, for it is ‘fragmented into a mass of competing interest 
groups’ (Fraser, 1990:59) who may or may not represent fairly all sections of the general public. 
At times, Habermas does speak of plural public spheres (Benhabib, 1992), although for him, it is 
vital that they come together, however problematically, with some kind of underlying harmony 
prior to, and in order for there to be, a confrontation between the public and established power.  
 
For Habermas, the potential for a public sphere exists in the commonalities and consensus which 
arise through the disinterested exchange of views, weakening traditional boundaries between 
groups. However, more open, mediated communication between groups in society may not 
achieve consensus but rather have other consequences, suggesting a reformulation of the 
character of the contemporary public sphere. Let us consider alternative models of the public 
sphere based on oppositional, conflictual or radical democratic situations in which diverse social 
groups discuss, negotiate and dispute.  
 
The tendency of the bourgeois public sphere which concerns Habermas is to become 
increasingly institutionalized and specialized, and so to increasingly exclude dissenting or critical 
voices. However, although apparently excluded, dissenting voices tend to form alternative 
forums for discussion which, for Negt and Kluge, generate an oppositional public sphere: ‘a type 
of public sphere which is changing and expanding, increasing the possibilities for a public 
articulation of experience’ (Kluge, 1981-2:211), for ‘in terms of community…what I have in 
common with other people…is the basis for processes of social change’ (ibid: 213). In contrast to 
the bourgeois public sphere, conflicts of interest are recognized and expected in this proletarian 
public sphere (Negt and Kluge, 1990). The sociological conditions of this public sphere are not 
those of access and disinterested contribution but forms of mass communication:  
A public sphere can be produced professionally only when you accept the degree of 
abstraction which is involved in carrying one piece of information to another place in society, 
when you establish lines of communication. That’s the only way we can create an 
oppositional public sphere and thus expand the existing public sphere. This is an occupation 
which is just as important as direct action, the immediate on-the-spot struggle.  
(Kluge, 1981-2:212)  
Others identify possibilities for the public sphere in local contexts where negotiation and debate 
are institutionally accepted. For example, Mann (1990:81) distinguishes ‘between the relatively 
universal and apolitical public sphere of mass media entertainment, and the vast numbers of de-
centered yet highly politicized public spheres currently existing within specific institutional 
contexts’. Through analysing a specific period of conflict at The City College of New York, 
Mann describes the emergence of a political public sphere which aims to ‘formulate unifying 
discourses capable of providing the basis for consciously chosen communities, in the face of 
myriad and conflicting interests’ (ibid: 81). This model of the public sphere does not depend on 
the unifying reason and consensus of Habermas’s public sphere nor on the inevitable conflicts 
between opposed counterpublics in the oppositional public sphere. Rather, it emphasizes the 
possibility for the negotiation of provisional unifying discourses in local spaces where a shared 
conception of community and joint action may have broken down.  
 
In practice, the bourgeois public sphere excluded major sections of society (women, the working 
class, children). This specialization restricted the diversity of meanings which contribute to 
opinion formation. Ironically, it also resulted in a host of marginal and conflicting voices, 
supporting the development of special interest groups to represent these repressed voices in a 
public sphere based on opposition or negotiation:  
Arrangements that accommodate contestation among a plurality of competing publics better 
promote the ideal of participatory parity than does a single, comprehensive, overarching 
public.  
(Fraser, 1990:66)  
We have seen that there is a debate occurring over the constitution of an ideal public sphere 
which differs in terms of the implications of organizing the public sphere prior to publication and 
debate. The two positions we have outlined suggest that either the public sphere should only 
include positions organized at the level of having gained social consensus, or that the process of 
public debate should be opened up at the point of contest and opinion formation. The 
Habermasian bourgeois public sphere also differs from the oppositional (or negotiation-based) 
public sphere in terms of the proposed character of rational–critical public debate. In the former, 
rational–critical debate involves reasoned consideration of other positions to generate a genuine 
amendment of original positions in the light of new arguments. The latter does not generate such 
a consensus, but rather aims for a negotiated compromise: each side brings pre-prepared 
arguments which carry rhetorical rather than rational weight so as to achieve the best 
compromise as judged by the more persuasive side. Neither side need concede the other’s 
arguments but merely agrees a midway position.  
 
Both forms of debate are reasoned, democratic procedures and both may be included by the mass 
media although the management of these different debate forms would differ. The bourgeois 
public sphere requires power inequalities to be transcended in the search for a consensus in 
favour of the public good. The oppositional public sphere attempts explicitly to balance 
differences, facilitating the representation of the less powerful and regulating the discourse of the 
more powerful in order to arrive at a fair and workable compromise.  
 
In all these conceptions of the public sphere a heavy burden is placed on dialogue, particularly 
when ‘people participate in more than one public’ (Fraser, 1990:70) and when these publics may 
overlap. Surely the mass media have a potentially significant role to play in bringing diverse 
cultures or groups together in discussion? Abrams argues that ‘the universality of broadcasting 
puts the media in a false relation to society. They are impelled to treat as homogenous what is in 
fact a tangle of more or less dissimilar groups’ (Abrams, 1964:53). However, in the oppositional 
public sphere, the media may play a potentially emancipatory role, albeit unintended, if we see 
appearing on television as cutting across the exclusions of traditional forms of representation. 
Television potentially disrupts the attempt to control involvement in and access to public 
debates, not simply by influencing such events but by transforming them into ‘media events’ in 
which a more diverse public may play a role. This forces the political into the personal arena and  
makes possible a form of life politics (Giddens, 1991). In contrast, Habermas is mainly 
concerned with the ways that the media as industrial institutions may disrupt the expression and 
construction of consensus in the life-world. While Habermas focuses on the disruption of the 
life-world and Fraser focuses on the transformation of political processes, both these are 
concerned with the potentially disruptive and transformative effects of the mass media.  
 
Drawing on both liberal and critical traditions, Curran (1991) offers a radical democratic theory 
of the mass media. A democratic mass media should represent all significant interest groups, 
thereby ‘assisting the equitable negotiation or arbitration of competing interests through 
democratic processes’ (Curran, 1991:30). While this requirement is operationalized differently in 
different countries, it has always been present over the history of the mass media, at least through 
the radical and alternative press. Curran argues for wider public access to the mainstream media 
so that special interest groups, pressure groups and so forth, may counter the privileged access 
and impact of elite groups. On this view, ‘the media are assumed to be caught in an ideological 
crossfire rather than acting as a fully conscripted servant of the social order’ (Curran, 1991:37).  
 
For Habermas, public criticism has been appropriated by the culture industry, transforming the 
public into a mindless mass. As the system increasingly penetrates the life-world, any 
institutional space from which the public might oppose established power, such as that once 
provided by the bourgeois public sphere, is undermined and a crisis of legitimation results. 
Proponents of the oppositional public sphere regard the legitimation crisis as resulting from 
established power imposing elite views on the public, (mis)conceived as a homogeneous mass, 
such that the actual diversity of voices is excluded from the public sphere. For while the 
mindless mass undermines the critical rationality demanded by Habermas, the homogeneous 
mass undermines the diversity perceived by, for example, Fraser. Habermas wants the public to 
create a position from which it can debate with established power. He also implies that critical 
rationality is now lost to the life-world as the public sphere has been refeudalized. Fraser thinks, 
in contrast, that the life-world is rich in critical voices which go unheard by established power.  
 
Underlying these debates is a question as to whether the public has become fragmented, making 
collective action impossible or diversified, where diversity has the potential to subvert those 
ideological processes which construct the public as a mass to be governed. Different answers 
suggest different solutions to the legitimation crisis. One can focus on instituting a public sphere 
to produce a consensus which can engage with established power through critical discussion. 
Here a liberal conception of the self-conscious individual as the locus of reason is presumed–the 
bourgeois gentleman (Dews, 1987). Or one can aim to give voice to the diversity of subject 
positions in society so as to subvert the hegemony of the elite and challenge established power 
into taking account of the various oppositional interests in the public sphere. Or at least, on this 
latter view, the public might escape or resist state control by deflecting or reappropriating 
meanings, exploiting the fact that control can only be applied locally and provisionally and 
refusing the subject position of the mass by responding in unpredictable ways to the dictates of 
the state; we borrow here from Foucault’s (1970) analysis of power in modern society as 
distributed, negotiable and ever-shifting.  
 
For Foucault, the possibilities for change are rooted in the fragile, dispersed and contestable 
nature of power in modern society, not in the construction of an ideal individual or public who 
will debate ‘head to head’ with established power. Thus we should not then inquire about the 
possibilities for an emancipatory media in the sense of either constructing a consensual public 
opinion to challenge an idealized, centralized established power or giving the oppressed an 
opportunity to resist. Rather they may provide a site where the distributed processes of power 
can be enacted and resisted in diverse ways.  
 
To the majority of the public who support the status quo, these expectations of conflict and 
diversity may appear unreasonable:  
You have to have a minority to make sure that the other side has its say, whether the minority 
is the people who complain about their GPs or the gay community or drug pushers. And on 
the box it looks like it is an equal say. Sometimes you don’t always appreciate that the 
minority is a very small minority. (D4.202)  
Sometimes it is an equal voice which they don’t deserve. The chap who keeps the rottweilers 
must be allowed to have his say–the rottweiler is a very nice dog. (D4.204)  
POLITICAL ACTION  
How do discussions in a public sphere, however conceived, translate into action consequences? 
For Habermas, there are no longer any such consequences, for in a democracy:  
The citizens themselves participate in the formation of collective consciousness, but they 
cannot act collectively…today politics has become an affair of a functionally specialized 
subsystem.  
(Habermas, 1987a: 360)  
Political action is commonly understood in terms of voting: ‘according to the theory of 
democratic government, an informed populace is the bulwark of freedom…it is the citizen’s duty 
to form an opinion about public affairs and to express it at the ballot-box’ (Oskamp, 1977:97). 
However, other forms of expression of public opinion may also be significant, broadening the 
notion of political action to include the discursive (see Curran, 1991; Gastil, 1992). Indeed, the 
common-sense opposition between talk and action, with its implicit devaluation of talk, has itself 
been challenged: talk is action, action is communicative (Austin, 1962; Quinn and Holland, 
1987). Mann (1990) provides a case study of how a public sphere, in this case, a local 
community-based public sphere, can promote actual political action, although she sees the media 
as relatively disengaged from lived social practices and hence concerned with escape from rather 
than connection with everyday experiences. Nonetheless:  
Public spheres of discursive interaction, such as television, play a large role in bridging or 
mediating the gap between our unrealized political ideals and our lived social relationships. 
The interesting questions involve the quality of that mediation.  
(Mann, 1990:87)  
Fraser links the public sphere to a Goffmanian dramaturgical model: ‘a theatre in modern 
societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk’ (Fraser, 1990:57; 
Goffman, 1981). Thus an analysis of the public sphere is indispensable to critical social theory 
because, broadly speaking, political theory has hitherto neglected the role of public 
communication in the democratic process, even though ‘changes in media structure and media 
policy…are properly political questions of as much importance as the question of whether or not 
to introduce proportional representation, of relations between local and national government, of 
subsidies to political parties’ (Garnham, 1990:104). One wonders why talking face-to-face with 
one’s member of parliament in the MP’s surgery or at a public meeting is regarded as political 
participation, but not talking to one’s MP on television, or watching someone else talk to one’s 
MP.  
 
If not political participation, public forums such as access and participation programmes, can be 
thought of as social events and so involve informal, social participation. This raises questions 
about the rights and responsibilities of the ordinary person when he or she is transformed into a 
public social actor and hence about his or her relations to those in power. In a participatory 
democracy, consent and public participation are mediated in a discursive context which affords 
opportunities for involvement and dangers of persuasion for the various interested groups in 
society (Gastil, 1992). Surely the public sphere must affect voting, trade union and pressure 
group activities and so forth, by affecting the climate of public opinion, by setting the agenda for 
discussion, and by framing the meaning of key terms in political debate? Interestingly, political 
participation as narrowly defined is a minority activity–few among the general public participate 
in pressure groups, trade unions or public meetings, and even voting is dropping off in advanced 
capitalist countries. A more discursive notion of participation may be as significant for involving 
the majority of the public in the fairly undemanding activity of talk and opinion formation. Even 
some of the medium’s critics argue that in some programmes:  
Not only is information of some public importance effectively communicated, but a 
contribution is made to the discussion of public issues and a public hitherto excluded from 
such discussions at any influential level is given access–if only as spectators–to the arenas in 
which public issues are decided. Television functions, as the Press once functioned, to create 
and maintain an informed and politically relevant public opinion.  
(Abrams, 1964:69)  
This positioning of the media as marginal to political processes is being challenged by 
proponents of oppositional, local and negotiated public spheres. These latter would distinguish 
between the events which are peripheral and those which have the appearance of the marginal 
but which significantly affect the negotiation and circulation of meanings in contemporary 
society (Giddens, 1992; Shields, 1991). Conceived as such a space, the media and popular 
culture in general are part of discursive democracy rather than a sphere of social activity 
separated from the political.  
THE MASS MEDIA AS CULTURAL FORUM  
The development of broadcasting in its institutional forms has had major consequences for 
modern democratic politics…It became a forum for debate and discussion on current matters 
of general concern, and thus a new site for the formation of public opinion.  
(Collins et al. 1986:212)  
Isn’t that the climate of today, that people will not be muffled. So you can demand something 
from television and radio, it is more independent than it used to be. (D4.187)  
It’s part of the democratic process. It is a good thing to air issues, in general. (D4.91)  
Informal, mass mediated participation results in what Newcomb and Hirsch (1984) have termed 
a cultural forum for topical public discussion and debate, as distinct from, although potentially 
overlapping with, the public sphere. The cultural forum may not generate a clear and consensual 
position but rather offers a range of diverse positions, providing an active role for the viewer in 
debate. In this respect, it is more akin to the oppositional than the bourgeois public sphere. For 
Newcomb and Hirsch (1984), even if conservative viewpoints are advocated, this is less 
significant than the airing of the debate: it is the ‘range of response, the directly contradictory 
readings of the medium, that cue us to its multiple meanings’ (Newcomb and Hirsch, 1981:68). 
While this media discussion occurs in public it is echoed and continued privately in the living 
room, connecting public forms of argument on television and the formation of private opinion.  
 
What is the product of a public debate? The traditional forum, based on the public sphere, 
implies not only a multiplicity of voices in debate and disagreement but also rules of debate by 
which conflicts are addressed, not evaded, and arguments are analysed rather than simply aired. 
These may be too stringent requirements for the present-day mass media cultural forum, which 
may more simply place arguments side by side without analysis or integration: the discussion 
may hold together because it functions as a recognized, and thus ‘coherent’, social occasion 
(Livingstone et al. 1992). To debate without conclusion is to celebrate the wisdom of the 
populace but to fight shy of promoting the insight of popular decisions beyond the bounds of the 
programme.  
 
Beyond providing people with a ‘place’ in which to meet (see Chapter 7) and permitting the 
expression of diverse voices, media debates also provide a source of social representations: ‘the 
equivalent, in our society, of the myths and belief systems in traditional societies; they might 
even be said to be the contemporary version of common sense’ (Moscovici, 1981:181). Indeed, 
television is increasingly a major medium for the generation of social representations or myths, 
and discussions and debates play their part here, particularly in popularizing expert knowledge 
for mass consumption (Livingstone, 1987; Moscovici, 1984).  
 
Moscovici (1984) outlines four conditions for the emergence of social representations, each of 
which fits the audience discussion programmes (see Chapter 3): the representation of an issue 
must emerge through the conversation of ordinary people (the studio audience); a vital 
contribution is provided by ‘amateur scholars’ who mediate between scientific knowledge and 
the laity (the experts); the debate is typically held at a time of social concern or crisis (the topical 
issues); finally, the social representation may emerge through a variety of debate forms, resulting 
in a vocabulary, lay theories, causal explanations, cognitive frames and prototypical examples 
(see Livingstone et al. 1992 for this process in discussion programmes).  
 
If participation includes talk as action, then a further consequence of audience participation is the 
construction and maintenance of social identities and of power relations. However, social and 
psychological implications of participating in public spheres, pseudo or genuine are unclear–
these form a significant concern of this book. Audience discussion programmes are a forum in 
which people can speak in their own voice, which, as Gilligan (1982) emphasizes, is vital for the 
construction of a gendered or cultural identity.  
PUBLIC CONTESTATION AND PLURAL VOICES IN THE AUDIENCE DISCUSSION 
PROGRAMME  
For some commentators, the audience discussion programme is an example of the pseudo-public 
sphere, with little to recommend it:  
The very call for a space of open public discussion is closed by the structural demands of that 
media form in which most discussion today takes place. Reason reveals itself to be what it 
really is: a show, a spectacle in which truth is not a content but, à la Russian Formalism, a 
device, an alibi, to get excitement going, to make a scene. One watches really more for the 
excitement, the good fight, than for the enunciating of reasoned positions within the society.  
(Polan, 1990:260)  
The audience discussion programme may not conform to the bourgeois debate and yet may still 
be compatible with oppositional conceptions of public spheres as sites of discursive contestation. 
Apparent lack of structure and control of argumentation may signify communicative conflict 
rather than emotional noise. For in addition to the specific and diverse public spheres, there must 
also be:  
The possibility of an additional, more comprehensive arena in which members of different, 
more limited publics talk across lines of cultural diversity…our hypothetical egalitarian, 
multi-cultural society would surely have to entertain debates over policies and issues affecting 
everyone. The question is: would participants in such debates share enough in the way of 
values, expressive norms, and, therefore, protocols of persuasion to lend their talk the quality 
of deliberations aimed at reaching agreement through giving reasons? In my view, this is 
better treated as an empirical question than as a conceptual question.  
(Fraser, 1990:69)  
One approach to this empirical question forms a central focus of this book: are audience 
discussion programmes a possible space for such communication? How could we determine the 
success of this communication and what character would the space have? These programmes 
may be partly about working out ways in which such communication can take place–negotiating 
a process of communication–rather than actually exhibiting a successful product: less a site 
where successful communication across diverse publics occurs than one where the exploration of 
such possibilities is undertaken. Television has a role to play in constructing a space rather than 
providing one, in negotiating an interactional style, and in bringing together diverse publics 
rather than displaying a common, unified public.  
 
There are other criteria we can suggest to evaluate audience discussion programmes as public 
spheres. Following Mills’s distinction between public and mass, the participants must be 
constructed as a public rather than a mass–with equal rights to speak, with feedback, with action 
consequences and without media manipulation. Also in this oppositional and plural public space, 
all topics must be permissible (as hosts of audience discussion programmes will agree)–no-one 
can speak for humanity in general by prespecifying topics of concern to diverse groups. The 
public agenda must emerge: it is typically thrown up by events of the day–the contests ‘out 
there’. Similarly, the definition of a successful conclusion cannot be specified in advance, for 
different participating publics may draw different conclusions from a debate: emergent 
conclusions may be plural and not necessarily consensual.  
 
Audience debates also raise issues of the relation between the expert or elite and the public, 
focusing on questions of knowledge, access and accountability. Lang and Lang (1983:297) 
concluded from the reporting of Watergate that ‘the ubiquitous presence of television most 
directly affects the political actors themselves. It forces them to be responsive to norms binding 
on other members of society’. They argue further that public debate complicates the resolution of 
political controversies because the media ‘modify the rules of the game, forcing politicians to 
justify themselves to an ever larger public’ (ibid: 305). Moreover, ‘to have influence, opinion has 
to be visible’ (ibid: 19). By providing a space for expressing public opinion, access programming 
implicitly allows public opinion to have influence–a populist move by which broadcasting 
organizations may claim accountability in terms of an ‘extra-political power base’ (Heller, 1978), 
apparently ‘seeking direct guidance from the people on the details of policy’ (Lang and Lang, 
1983:15).  
 
The cultural significance of putting ordinary people on television, then, is that the viewer is 
constructed as citizen, with the right to decide policy and the information–the data of everyday 
experience–on which decisions are based. Audience discussion programmes provide a space in 
which ordinary experiences are collected together as grounding for a decision, with the help or 
hindrance of experts:  
He managed to fill the studio with people all of whom had something different to contribute, 
people who were victims, there was a magistrate, there was an MP. You know, he had really 
done a good job of getting a group of people together who could all add something, and I’ve 
found this is rather characteristic of Kilroy’s programmes…I found it quite interesting that he 
had managed to obtain two people to sit in his audience and say that they would not condemn 
terrorism.  
(George, viewer)  
However, the participants in Habermas’s public sphere are private citizens, not state officials or 
official representatives of public bodies. In contrast, audience discussion programmes include 
members of various ‘official’ bodies (for example, parliament, the health service, charities, the 
police). These representatives of official state bodies are present in an official ‘public relations’ 
capacity, and so their presence has no necessary decision-making consequences. They are not 
acting as private citizens for they are there to be publicly accountable, as part of their official 
role. For Habermas, it is important that these discussions do not result in decisions, or else the 
critical potential would be lost–the public would become the state.  
 
However, some public debates do also have decision-making consequences–Fraser discusses the 
case of parliament; we could add the self-regulating activities of many local publics, as in 
Mann’s City College of New York example, or residential communities, trade unions, etc. As 
Fraser (1990) notes, as soon as such internal forums or ‘strong publics’ translate opinion into 
action, questions arise about their relation to the general public (‘weak publics’) whom they 
supposedly represent, and issues of representativeness and accountability come to the fore. There 
is a trade-off implicit in the construction of public spheres: they may provide open access or 
establish representatives; they may form opinion only or they may translate this into actions with 
questionable accountability.  
 
Having argued for plural public spheres rather than a unified consensus, we must ask about the 
(plural and diverse) relations between public spheres. Particularly, what forms of communication 
are possible, and how are these managed in relation to state intervention and power inequalities 
between participants? Fraser argues for a ‘post-bourgeois’ conception of the public sphere which 
raises crucial questions for a democratic society. She outlines four criteria for a post-bourgeois 
public sphere, which resemble Mills’s four criteria for a public as opposed to a mass, and which 
we can here ask directly of audience discussion programmes. Are social inequalities rendered 
visible? (Who goes on these programmes, how are they selected, what are their motivations for 
appearing?) How are different publics differentially empowered? (Who speaks, who is silent, 
who determines what can be said, how is the debate managed, whose voice concludes?) Which 
topics are labelled public or private? (How are topics selected, what is omitted, how are topics 
covered or selectively ignored?) How is public opinion translated into political or social action? 
(What social value or impact do these programmes have?)  
 
Extending the political franchise bestows political rights, which promote political interest beyond 
voting, and leads to a broader struggle to gain more political power and to the ‘widening of 
social conflict as the extension of the democratic revolution into more and more spheres of social 
life, into more social relations’ (Mouffe, 1988:95; see also Giddens, 1992). In this context, the 
audience discussion programme, as a forum for the expression of diversity, the contestation of 
multiple positions, and the interfacing of many discourses, becomes a part of contemporary 
political processes.  
CONCLUSIONS  
We have proposed that there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to analysing and assessing 
the role of the mass media in public life. One account, drawn principally from the work of 
Habermas, suggests that there is an ideal form of public debate which, if it can find an 
institutional context, potentially allows equality of access and equal rights to all citizens. This 
supports the development of public opinion which in turn limits the incursion of  
bureaucratic and political control into everyday life. On this view, we can ask whether the 
broadcast media, through access and participation programmes, are offering an institutional 
forum which orchestrates critical opinion, promoting or undermining the development of 
consensus between disinterested parties.  
 
Alternatively, critics such as Fraser and Mouffe suggest that the media can facilitate the 
expression of diverse political and social interests in order to form a working compromise 
between negotiated positions. Access and voice remain priorities but the underlying model of 
argumentation (negotiation versus critical discussion) and the underlying functions of the 
dialogue (compromise versus consensus) are changed, and the significance of social identities 
and social relations is no longer marginalized. Access and participation programmes should, 
according to this view, be evaluated in terms of how well they express a diversity of public 
voices and challenge established power to recognise the complexities of everyday life.  
 
The debate in social theory about the character of the public sphere relates to different political 
possibilities for the broadcast media:  
Among the key advantages of the revised public service model sketched here is its theoretical 
and practical recognition of complexity. Moving out from under the shadow of Lord Reith, it 
recognises that ‘freedom of communication’ comprises a bundle of (potentially) conflicting 
component freedoms. It acknowledges that in a complex society the original public service 
assumption that all the citizens of a nation-state can talk to each other like a family sitting 
down and chatting around the domestic hearth is unworkable; that it is impossible for all 
citizens simultaneously to be full-time senders and receivers of information; that at any point 
in time and space some citizens will normally choose to remain silent and only certain other 
individuals and groups will choose to communicate with others.  
(Keane, 1991:164–5)  
 
 
